This essay explores the movements of cinema as it is refashioned within an art gallery space. In addition it charts a number of research ideas as they find themselves manifest alongside Australian artist Susan Norrie’s digital video installation ‘ENOLA’ (2004). The essay engages with a current argument in new media theory surrounding the influence and relevance of the cinematic apparatus for analysis of new media, and suggests that although both cinema and new media can be understood through shared aspects of movement, duration, and sound, to reference cinema directly in a digital gallery installation also introduces a number of problematic issues surrounding representation and reality. These issues are discussed in relation to my firsthand experience of the work as relayed below.

As I walk up the stairs of the MCA in Sydney I am seduced by Muzak drifting from a small room screening Susan Norrie’s ‘ENOLA’. Following the sound to its source involves navigating a number of labyrinthine blind corners, after which I find four rows of wooden stools (arranged more like a temporary classroom than a cinema) set before a transparent back-lit screen low on an inside wall. Viewers who have adopted a stool are obviously lulled into the work’s rhythm; I join them, but make sure I have a direct route back toward the door, should I need to escape. The screen captures a camera’s drift over a miniature world. On screen are two tour guides dressed in futuristic charcoal hoodies. They loom over the environment, hiding the glare of the sun as they seek out and identify important sights for us. Mimicking the camera movement, they rotate like automatons in a shop window. Everything moves at the speed of a suffocating slow pan. Equidistant cars dance down a road, enacting a journey to work taken by millions each day. Movement is everywhere; in the sound, in the camera, in the accomplices, but as viewers we are not allowed the freedom of movement – we squat on the stools or stand leaning against the back walls of the gallery, the scale is not ours. This is not a cinema where we can forget ourselves inside its projections.

‘ENOLA’ by the fact of its title makes reference to the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 by the B-29 “Superfortress” bomber nicknamed the Enola Gay. Norrie’s earlier works, for example, Undertow, 2003, (AGNSW, Sydney) and Notes from the Underground, 2003 (MCA, Sydney) have dealt with uranium contamination and the impact of atomic research, including the atom bomb, on the world. In ‘ENOLA’ there is the sense that the artist is dealing
now with the aftermath of such an event. The glare of the bleaching light, the slowed motion and the absence of the usual bustle of a city, recalls other filmic representations of nuclear disaster aftermath, most particularly, Jimmy T. Murakami’s animation of Raymond Briggs’s *When the Wind Blows*, 1986; and less specifically, however still engaging, the quiet moment of aftermath within a dystopic framework in New Zealander Geoff Murphy’s *The Quiet Earth*, 1985. As a title, ‘ENOLA’ is used by Norrie as an evocative or associative term rather than a specific description. The viewer is made aware of the constructions and manipulations of time in a post-nuclear era. ‘ENOLA’ serves to incorporate a significant historical awareness as part of a construction of the future that is played out in a theme park that purports to exist in an eternal present.

Norrie has slowed time and movement down, and because of this, the perceptual field of the DV (digital video) has increased. We have time to see more than a still frame, but not enough time to catch the ‘real’ story. The theme park condenses continents into monuments as spatial boundaries and geographic borders are collapsed and rendered meaningless. The miniature cities before us move in slow motion, they are both uninhabited and full of people travelling, walking the streets, sitting in their cars, and leaving on aeroplanes (the constant sideways movement is like a merry-go-round) and we scan the expressionless faces before us in the hope of seeing someone we know. Wonder is replaced with bewilderment as New York City’s twin towers pass below us. Because it is marked by these perceptions of time ‘ENOLA’ introduces instability to the world displayed. In ‘ENOLA’ materiality as a connection to the actual is experienced repeatedly at a remove. That is, these appear to be familiar cities, but their locations have shifted, they have shrunk, been packed up close together, their spaces invade and overlap. The city has become merely a setting for a ubiquitous monument. As viewers we are implicated in the evocation of calm, repetitious, miniaturised movements. The world here should be clean and familiar, but Norrie’s hovering camera and the ominous but disengaged presence of our guides/guardians suggest otherwise. The sound track Muzak is the final erasure of any evidence of external time and in its place we are left with a reality effect. Things are not how they are supposed to be, nevertheless lulled into complicity by the Muzak we go along for the ride. (Muzak is music rendered silent, compressed so as to not shock, or incite awareness of its presence; Muzak is not even the illusion of sound, but filler.)

‘ENOLA’ suggests that although digital installations owe part of their history to cinema, they are not simply cinematic images that behave according to certain principles of imitation and simulation. Instead the installation offers what Paul Virilio describes as the “relative fusion/confusion of the factual (or operational, if you prefer) and the virtual.” The spaces of the representation do not quite line up with our expectations, so there is a disjunction between representation and perception. Traditional cinema has always made use of this reality effect, encouraging its viewers to immerse themselves inside an apparatus by which they can experience the real up there on a flat screen. Virilio sees it as crucial that we understand that “the ascendancy of the ‘reality effect’” is to do with perception. We want to believe that the cinema and anything related to it is real, and tells us something true. The reality effect is something we not only let happen but we encourage and play along with its deception within the installation machine. Obviously the images of cities, people, cars and mountains within Norrie’s installation are not real, but (like Muzak) they are close enough to be suspicious. The
The digital image presented by ‘ENOLA’ is a machine of “sightless vision.” The DV contains images which might not have been seen before, and it is unclear whether they align with material reality. The viewer enters a space where the screened real is questionable and presented at a remove. It is not clear where the line between reality, imitation and simulation can be drawn. The installation then documents a shift from reality caught and displayed upon a supported surface (an external material reference space) towards a reality which “now emerges in relation to time, to the exposure time that allows or edits seeing.” Instead of encouraging a cinematic suspension of disbelief, ‘ENOLA’ appears to contain disbelief itself; a consistent real which is a reality already inverted and made in the time of our viewing/ perception, apprehension.

So where did the idea of the real come from? Ina Blom says that the notion of the real in art of the second half of the 20th century is “anchored in different types of interpretations of the relation between image and reality.” That is, the real is the result of:

an exploration of the continuity between artistic process and process ‘in the real world’ [that] was generated by an awareness of the mediated nature of reality itself, i.e. an awareness of a real that is not simply given, but continually produced through signifying processes for which (certain types of) artistic creation could even seem to provide powerful conceptual models.

Yet we know that although it contained highly plausible reality effects, (hence the apocryphal tale of the first viewers of the Lumière brothers’ film L’Arrivée d’un train à la Ciotat, 1895, ducking and fleeing the theatre screaming) film was never real in the first place. And, although ‘ENOLA’ plays with cinema’s tropes, it is obvious for a number of reasons that this is not cinema. In particular, Norrie questions the reality effect of cinema as it passes into digital moving image. Already existing at one remove (the images it presents are of a simulated scale model real), ‘ENOLA’ does not assume a given real, but proceeds by layering illusion with assumed reality, with apparent or perceptual reality. In ‘ENOLA’ neither the light nor the architecture are literally cinematic. This shifts the apparatus of cinema profoundly, as cinema has always been dependant on viewer immobility and darkness for its representational believability. The spaces of ‘ENOLA’ are not darkened, nor is the viewer immobilised. Instead, cinema is folded into the reality effect of digital installation. Referencing Marshall McLuhan’s equations of electricity and light, Timothy Murray has commented that in digital works “viewers are beckoned to denaturalize the architectonics of cinema as a means of thinking space within the various folds of the subdivision of electric light.” In ‘ENOLA’ the projection apparatus is hidden and silenced within the smooth surfaces of a digital back projection screen. Murray suggests that we think of a new type of digital apparatus which generates a different sort of viewer and thus a different sort of reality effect. Without an external authority, the miniature real of ‘ENOLA’ is re-rendered miniature DV. For the viewer, the journey is essentially easy to take, and lasting just twelve minutes becomes visual Muzak, comfortable enough to watch over and over ad nauseam. Any vestiges of external reality or cinematic architecture get lost in the slow seduction of a travelogue of an impossible world, accompanied by the uncanny remembrance of some catastrophic event.

In its Platonic formulation, representation is understood as a recognisable likeness of something real (but does not take the place of the thing itself, which in its insistent materiality
is anyway only standing in for an ideal). There is a fundamental triangulation between an image; the thing out there that it reflects; and the viewer. From this assertion has grown an unspoken but agreed dictum that an artwork cannot be accorded the status of being representational until both the viewer and the represented ‘real’ can be isolated from and situated as external to the work. This reflective model still holds a place in histories of visual culture, (particularly in discussions of photography where it becomes intimately tied to notions of truth). Additionally, as soon as the representational artwork could be shifted from location to location, it entered an economy of exchange. The critique of this model of representation is similarly well trod soil in art and cultural theory: Walter Benjamin’s loss of aura and rise of the mimetic; Roland Barthes’ eternally present referent, and Jean Baudrillard’s phases of simulation map one particular lineage. As Lev Manovich comments: “the representational machine keeps hiding and revealing itself.” Revisiting this concept of representation means an inevitable turn towards the viewer’s reality. For Barthes,

representation is not defined directly by imitation: even if one gets rid of notions of the ‘real’ of the ‘raiessemblable’, of the ‘copy’ there will still be representation for so long as a subject (author, reader, spectator or voyeur) casts his gaze towards a horizon on which he cuts out the base of a triangle, his eye (or his mind) forming the apex.

Representation and reality are connected by a geometrical shaping of the gaze. Barthes seems to suggest that not only if I look, but because I look, what I see will be a representation. To move away from this is death: “a fetishist subject is required to cut out the tableau.” Representation as isolated exchange between image and viewer simultaneously developed into the flat planes of modernist painting, and the darkened architectures of the movie theatre. Cinematic representation, however, broke the representational covenant and presented itself as real by suggesting that the external referent is a knowledge shared with the viewer of the possible real (just past) rather than the actual present. Cinema suggests to a viewer that given ‘this’ set of circumstances, it is possible that ‘this’ really happened. Cinematic theory has spent many words analysing this reality effect – the sense that we are up there with the hero playing along, in a kind of condensed but hyperreal time, or that as women we desperately desire their attention, identifying with the rescued princess, rather than the handsome prince. As digital installation, ‘ENOLA’ references these histories but does something else with them, for it doubles the external referent and instead of pointing us out towards it, loops us back into a miniature contrived space, which reflects the possible without the actual. Offering a potentially inhabitable space, (in the way that Alice’s slipping into a rabbit hole is both possible and impossible) the architectures of ‘ENOLA’ are simultaneously possible and virtual.

But how did it get here? Digital media has been simultaneously derided and celebrated for the role it plays in hyperreal simulation. Darren Tofts comments that in this digital age we cannot know that what we see will be real, because “apparent reality endures well... with the ambiguous presence of the hyperreal all around us, the best you can hope for is that it might be real.” The might-be-real does not necessarily have a connection with a reality out there, but instead with how we as viewers represent what we see. Both positions situate the viewer as the maker of the gaze, the generator of the representation. The representation is not pre-existent, and here it shares something with digital code. From within the discourses
of programming, Lev Manovich asserts that “the reality effect produced by the representation can itself be related to a set of numbers.”¹⁹ (Reducing the representation back to code) Manovich’s approach to representation is apparent in an early discussion on virtual worlds in which he comments that “electronic art from its very beginning was based on a new principle: modification of an already existing signal.”²⁰ Electronic art in this model is parasitic on this ‘already existing signal’. Selection, modification, transcoding, and alteration replace the process of creation. It is a framework where everything digital is always already quantified. Manovich suggests that the digital image reached this point by developing out of two pre-existent representational strands. The first traces a language of representation (that is, presentation of the real – points to the real, there) from renaissance painting to cinema. The second traces simulation (that is, imitation of the real – appearing to be real, here) from mosaic to fresco. The first is framed, isolated, referring always outside of itself, reality is found over there. The second adheres more closely to architectures, encompasses spaces, and suggests that there is no need to look outside of the image, reality can be found here. Both lead to a digital numerical representation which generates installations, like ‘ENOLA’, which are both here and there, actual and virtual, dependant on a digital reality effect.

Manovich comments that “new media objects are cultural objects” and as such they can be said to “represent, as well as help construct some outside referent.”²¹ New media objects exist physically for Manovich and are connected to both historical information and a system of categories – but are biased. Representation, Manovich argues, is always used in opposition to other terms, and he outlines three: representation simulation; representation action; and representation communication. In his analysis, Manovich does not break down representation itself, but its relationships.²² The viewer’s experience might be of exchange and interaction between the representational worlds but they are still separated by a frame. This is due largely to Manovich’s reliance on the histories and models of cinema for his definitions. Throughout his argument, Manovich retains a sense of the screen as “a rectangular surface that frames a virtual world and that exists within the physical world of a viewer without completely blocking her visual field.”²³ Despite this limitation placed on the relationship between new media works and the screen, Manovich suggests that representation is simply an organising and privileging of certain sorts of data over others. Where this organisation occurs has always been contentious in discussions of cinema.²⁴

Arguing that prior to new media, visual imagery was sampled and then presented to a viewer in a linear order; Manovich claims that new media “abandons this ‘human-centred’ representation.”²⁵ These representations begin a process which appears traditionally cinematic, whereby “time is mapped onto two-dimensional space, where it can be managed, analysed and manipulated more easily.”²⁶ Because of its malleability, the possibility is presented that new media works might divorce themselves from a reality out there and “act [only] as representations.”²⁷ The point for Manovich is that once the new media work enters the digital it looses a direct connection to reality and becomes instead numerical representation. It is possible to develop Manovich’s point to argue that because everything digital is coded, in digital installation time itself becomes another analogy of information, and thus is opened up to noise. The work might ‘appear’ to be cinema but is only a metonym for it. The suggestion here is that representation generated through the digital just wants to be
free. If this is the case, where might this leave the relationship between the object understood as representational and the object understood as material? What can be the reality effect of a new media object?

How do we solve this paradox of digital representation? Reading the new media object as representational looks at what it does; reading it as material appears to look at what it is. Manovich’s position seems to conflate the two, arguing that it is because of its fragmentation and numerical coding at the material level that the digital image has shifted our usual approach to, and expectations of, representation. Mark Hansen takes issue with this and argues that “if the digital image is an accumulation of such discontinuous fragments...there is no longer anything materially linking the content of the image with its frame.”  

It is still representational content, but fragmented, free to move outside the confines of a frame, and it does this by mutating its very surfaces and interlacing these with a viewer; so much so that a reality effect is no longer tied to an external reality, but to the processes of viewing. It is “action and representation at the same time.”  

Manovich does not seem to want to take the discussion this far, suggesting two representational tools which allow the user to intervene in the production of the real: the image-instrument and the image-interface. In both, the viewer becomes the user; nevertheless both retain a sense of the cinematic screen. As Hansen says,

…it is not simply that the image provides a tool for the user to control the ‘infoscape’ of contemporary material culture, as Manovich suggests, but rather that the ‘image’ has itself become a process, and as such, has become irreducibly bound up with the activity of the body.  

Hansen sees his image giving ‘form’ to information, and it “must be extended to encompass the entire process by which information is made perceivable through embodied experience.”  

Hansen’s take is that new media is “new” because of its displacement of framing functions back onto the body.  

On the other hand, new media will always be cinematic for Manovich. For him, (even though the details of these frames have changed dramatically) new media frames and screens the image. However, the process of getting there is different to the pre-digital. Hansen says that new media makes the body different. This argument between them involves the location of representation versus the location of perception.

If the body enframes the new media representation whether by way of an interface machine, or the body as frame itself, then the body’s insistent material presence gives further evidence that digital installation does actually shift the languages and parameters of cinema. For “when the cinema auditorium is suddenly plunged into artificial darkness, its configuration, the bodies in it, dissolve.”  

The dissolving of the audience’s body is not a process of abandoning the body, but due to the paradox of representation – as encompassed by cinema’s attempts to represent reality (life) – the body as image returns back to the body in the theatre. Or as Jean-Louis Baudry puts it, cinema reproduces the scene of the “impression of reality.”  

Flung away from the body, Deleuze argues, cinema’s shifts in sequence and cuts and splices in time actually end up altering the location of perception, away from the immobilised viewer and into a movement space of “gaseous perception.”  

As Clare Colebrook explains, the implication is that “film itself, the material of film – its yellowness – is not something we see through to grasp reality; we see ‘seeing’.”
In ‘ENOLA’ this shifted perception is multiplied many times over. We see the camera as it sees; we see the visitors to the theme park looking at the world below them as they step carefully between its buildings; we watch the tour guides watching that scene; we see the spaces of the installation; we see the stools which watch the screen mutely; and we see ourselves amidst others watching the screen. At no point do any of these levels of vision refer back to a ‘reality’, but instead, they keep us aware of the multiple and material structures of the architectures of the installation. However, this multiplication and fragmentation of the cinema is not only visual. As a sound track, Muzak cannot adhere to the surfaces of the screen; it does not add to a narrative, or drive the visual loop, but infiltrates and seeps out of the spaces of the room. The Muzak ties our viewing bodies into the architectures of the installation, and lingers with us long after we leave. It is through this endlessly repetitive sound track that ‘ENOLA’ makes a final slip from the grasp of cinema possible.

As simultaneous event and representation the moving time image of cinema is a material force: it is and does. If we follow Deleuze (instead of being simply the result of a play of reality effects), cinema is materially constructed from cuts and splices as well as layers of time and intensity and encompasses a viewing body in forces of vibration and resonance. Despite Hansen’s insistence, Deleuze never disembodied the viewer, but instead expanded the parameters of materiality to include the material of the cinema as well as the body, not privileging one or the other. Both become literally and materially tied together in the rhythms of “any-space-whatever.” Paul Miller (aka DJ Spooky) expands this re-embodiment of the material event of the cut and splice when he suggests that:

Whenever you look at an image or listen to a sound, there’s a ruthless logic of selection that you have to go through to simply create a sense of order. The end product of this palimpsest of perception is a composite of all the thoughts and actions you sift through over the last several micro-seconds – a sound bite reflection of a process that updates Frankenstein’s monster, but this time the imaginary creature is made of the interplay fragments of time, code, and (all puns intended) memory and flesh.

The cut and the splice of cinema as discussed here are not solely narrative devices, but occur across the whole architecture of the cinema. When that architecture is folded into the digital and then further shifted into the spaces of installation, the fragmentation becomes a more profound force. New media reality effects do not dissolve the viewing body, nor do they insist on an essential embodiment which is presented as a framed reality from out there, (like Manovich’s image-instrument, or Hansen’s body-as-frame). Instead, they suggest a process whereby the virtuality of representation is somehow still vested in the material and actual.

‘ENOLA’ is both a noisy and silent digital installation. The apparent disinterest of the camera as manifested by its continual spinning movement renders no one thing more important than any other; the visual spaces are silenced. The constant noise of the Muzak, however, offers little support. There is no point at which we can fix perspective (either visual or aural); and our disorientation becomes complicated further by our searching for stability or reality within the frames. There is no predetermined cut; no point at which to make an informed narrative selection; and no transmission of an external framed reality. ‘ENOLA’ proceeds by way of sound
bites, not reality effects. A sound bite contains an ambiguity of matter. It is a resource without a necessary source in reality. The digital sound bite is a way of undermining the structural reality effect of cinema; whilst retaining a concern with the combination of materialities that cinema engenders. ‘ENOLA’ moves cinema aside, by first leaving the light on, and secondly by embedding just enough fragments of Muzak in our bodies so that the work never lets us leave; so that the narrative never ends... It’s a small world after all.


2 Norrie says that the work grew out of an initial idea to create a miniature children’s cinema. For her, the installation space is that of a children’s cinema. This reading of the space is echoed in the Biennale catalogue essay by Barbara Creed. Creed argues that Norrie’s work is uniquely cinematic. (Barbara Creed, “Susan Norrie,” in Isabel Carlos, ed., Biennale of Sydney, 2004; On Reason and Emotion, Sydney: Biennale of Sydney 2004, 158.) However, the stools are too high for a child, and too low for an adult; the space is cold and well lit. It feels more like a cubby house, but one designed by an adult, not a child. It became a trademark of the Sydney Biennale 2004 that ‘video installation’ involved a screen, a projector, and an arrangement of chairs!

3 One time I visited, the stools were spread everywhere in a real mess obviously just inhabited by children. The next time the stools were in very neat rows, raising uncertainty whether their role was installation object or seat. The original video footage was filmed at Tobu World Square, a theme park out of Nikko, Japan. Norrie chose to focus in the film only on America and Europe, although 132 countries and 14,000 human figures are presented at 1/25 scale models (the humans are 7cm tall). The theme park is set on three acres. As Norrie said: “there was the world on display, a theme park in an isolationist country...The spaces of the theme park are not contaminated, nothing can go wrong.” (Susan Norrie “Artists talk”, Biennale of Sydney, June 2004.)

4 At one point in ‘ENOLA’ we see full size people walking around in the background; they have the impact of the sudden appearance of giants in a fairy story. They do not appear real. A friend commented that they observed viewers of the work walk out as soon as the New York Twin Towers arrived. It became a deciding point in the loop. Was the work suddenly rendered unreal (through a confusion of materials) when what we know has been destroyed is suddenly ‘present’ before us?

5 Paul Virilio, The Vision Machine, translated by Julie Rose (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press and The British Film Institute, 1994), 60.

6 The illusion is exposed in a conversation between Kermit the Frog and Croaker (another frog) when they both stumble into a movie theatre. Kermit expresses his desire to be in the movies and Croaker replies “…they’re 15 foot tall and flat, the movies is no place for a frog.” David Grumpel (dir.) Kermit’s Swamp Years: The Real Story Behind Kermit the Frog’s Early Years, 2002.

7 Virilio, The Vision Machine, 60. Virilio says that the reality principle has long been a contested ground in the sciences.


9 Ibid.


12 Timothy Murray, “Digital Incompossibility: Cruising the Aesthetic Haze of the New Media”, in Arthur and Marylouise Kroker (eds), Ctheory, Article A078, (1/13/2000) <www.ctheory.net/printer.asp?id=121>, last visited on 16/06/03.
Jacques Attali argues that “for representation to have meaning, then what is represented must be experienced as having an exchangeable and autonomous value, external to the representation and intrinsic to the work.” Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music*, translation of *Bruit*: *essai sur l’économie politique de la musique*, 1977, by Presses universitaires de France, translated by Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 58.


Roland Barthes. *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. Originally published in French as *La Chambre Claire*, 1980, by Editions du Seuil, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 5-6. Barthes notes that: “I call ‘photographic referent’ not the optionally real thing to which an image or a sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph. Painting can feign reality without having seen it. Discourse combines signs which have referents, of course, but these referents can be and are most often ‘chimeras’. Contrary to these imitations, in Photography I can never deny that the thing has been there.” (76) Later in the text he writes: “Every photograph is a certificate of presence.” (87)

This discussion is continued by Darren Tofts with regards to the digital still photographic image: “the [digital] image is very much there, visible to the eye as a captured object, caught at the very moment of its passing, as in the taking of a photograph. But at the same time it isn’t there at all. Its photorealism is the result of a complex variation of differential intensities of light and shade within the grid of screen pixels.” Darren Tofts, “‘Unseizable Enigma’: Notes Towards a New Morphology of the Image” in *Parallax: Essays on Art, Culture and Technology* (Sydney: Interface, 1999), 94. In ‘ENOLA’ it is the issue of material presence which provides the illusion of simulation.


Tofts, “Notes Towards a New Morphology”, 96.

Manovich, “Global Algorithm 1.3.”

Ibid.


For example, representation is seen by Manovich as two separate but simultaneous traditions: simulation (tied to architecture or fresco which is “continuous with and extended from the normal space”, as developed into sculptural practice and a mobile viewer who could walk around the work); and its opposite representation (whereby the painting on canvas was itself made mobile and thus immobilising the viewer before it). Manovich, *Language of New Media*, 113.

Malcolm Le Grice, *Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age* (London: British Film Institute, 2001), 197. Metz argues that “everything in film is recorded and that what is recorded is by definition absent.”

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(Quoted in Le Grice, 173.) Le Grice, in an argument representative of the concerns of structural cinema, takes issue with this construction of the viewer and the reduction of film to absent content; and argues instead for the insistent presence of film’s materiality, which refers to the spectator subject as “a partially constituted transmitting instance (of the film’s social and cultural effect)”, 197.


Ibid.

Manovich, *Language of New Media*, 16.


Virilio, talking about the futurists, says that “the latest means of action are means of representation at the same time...a new fusion – confusion of perception and object which already foreshadows video and computer operations of analogous simulation.” *The Vision Machine*, 29.

Mark Hansen, *New Philosophy for New Media*, 10. Hansen says that his project is to connect the image with the body, with “its own embodied formation or creation.” This combination of image and body is what he calls the “digital-image” (10).


Hansen claims that Deleuze abandons the specific embodiment essential to Bergson, in an attempt to move towards a more generalised framework for becoming. Hansen suggests that he makes a somehow purer reading of Bergson by dismissing Deleuze’s insistent fluidity and the figure of the body without organs. I think he is incorrect here.


Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986), 80-84. Deleuze develops this idea from Dziga Vertov’s documentary Kino-eye. Through the metaphor of the kino-eye, Vertov could suggest an eye no longer attached to the human, but the camera, an eye which could move without bodily restriction. Dorothea Olkowski discusses the implications of this kind of re-thinking of the structures of representation: “What happens on the philosophical, visual, artistic, and ultimately psychic level when the structure-Other collapses, when the subject no longer suffers annihilation because she has found the crack in the system of representation of the world that otherwise structures all life?” Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California, 1999), 195.

Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze*, 32.


“Any-space-whatever” describes the interconnectedness and constructions of affect, the body and space. Deleuze, *The Movement-Image*, 117.


**Susan Ballard** is currently Manager of the Centre for Contemporary Arts and Politics at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. She is also completing her PhD at the College of Fine Arts, University of New South Wales. Her research focuses on materiality and noise in digital installation.